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$EVWUDFW
According to a wide literature persons are not able to evaluate their own skills and knowledge, but 
the discussion on the nature, extension and determinants of this phenomenon is still open. This 
paper aims at proposing new empirical evidence on overconfidence and its determinants, trying to 
find out the possible effect of past performance on present optimism. I  test my students’ 
calibration and confidence in predicting their future results, comparing their expectations and real 
grades. My analysis allows showing the existence of overconfidence, its reduction in two following 
tests, and its non linear relation with students’ capacities. Besides, I  focus my attention on the 
effect of the grade my students got at the end of high school. This is used a proxy of their past 
experience and habit to get good or bad grades. Past success determined overconfidence. This 
idea is connected to the literature on heuristics and rule based perception. 
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This paper aims at proposing new empirical evidence on overconfidence, focusing on a new 
possible determinant. A wide literature evidences that people are not able to evaluate their own 
skills and knowledge and often tend to be excessively optimist, but the discussion on the nature, 
extension and determinants of this phenomenon is still open. My analysis is based on a kind of 
natural experiment. I  test, in fact, my students’ calibration and confidence in predicting their future 
results, comparing their expectations and real grades. This data allows testing for the existence of 
overconfidence and for its relation with students’ capacities. Besides, I  focus my attention on the 
effect of the grade they got at the end of high school, used a proxy of their past experience and 
habit to get good or bad grades and therefore of their previous performances in study. So I can 
study if past success influenced my students’ overconfidence and capacity to calibrate their 
expectations. This idea is inspired from the literature on heuristics and rule based perception and 
allows linking the analysis of overconfidence with a wider literature on rationality. 
The first part of the paper recalls some results of the literature on overconfidence and its 
determinants, focusing on the effect of knowledge and capacity and rule following behavior (§2.1). 
I  then presents some results on student's overconfidence (§2.2). Then I present my data (§3) and 
propose some hypothesis (§4), which are then tested (§5) and discussed (§6). 
 
%DFNJURXQG
 
2YHUFRQILGHQFHDQGH[SHULPHQWV
 
In many cases, people seem to be excessively confident in their abilities and optimistic about their 
chance of success. Van Den Steen (2004) recalls a wide series of different results and gives a 
rational justification of what he calls over-optimism, a general term which includes many kinds of 
biases. Overconfidence is one of the way in which over-optimism takes place, and usually indicates 
the tendency to over-estimate the correctness of one's answers. Confidence in one's knowledge is 
usually assessed asking persons a series of questions and at the same time requiring them to state 
their confidence on the correctness of their previous replies. As noted by Klayman et al (1999), in 
a first phase, researchers agreed on the idea that persons are usually overconfident and 
systematically over-estimated their chances of giving correct answers. When stating a level of 
confidence equal to, say, 90%, persons were seen as able to answer correctly at a very lower 
percentage (like 75%). Some human cognitive and motivational attitudes were and still are called 
for explaining these results. When trying to answer a question on which they are not sure, persons 
search in their memory for cues. The mechanism of associative memory could make it easier 
remembering information which confirms one's own initial ideas. The first impression could, 
therefore, appears to be more founded than it is, with a following increase in (over)confidence 
(Rabin and Schrag, 1999; Russo and Schoemaker, 1992). Subjects, besides, like thinking to be 
smart and to be correct and therefore could tend to over-estimate their chance of correctness. 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), yet, show a less linear relation in a similar experiment. Subjects 
were, as usual, requested to state a level of confidence for their answers to a cultural test. Their 
analysis shows how those who knew less are overconfident, but those who knew more could be 
even underconfident. They found no individual differences related to intelligence or expertise. So, 
those who know more (on a specific question) doesn’t really know more on how much they know. 
Gigerenzer (1991) confirms and explains their findings. In his view, subjects take decision using 
simple but smart heuristics. Many of the tests used in these kind of experiments, for example, 
could be faced using a specific rule, defined the recognition heuristics. Frequently participants to 
these experiments are required, for example, to indicate which city, between two proposed, has 
more inhabitants. They should also state a probability of correctness for each of their answers. 
Perfect calibrated persons should, as an example, reply correctly to half of the questions for which 
their confidence is stated as equal to 50%. Systematic differences between the two values can 
indicate overconfidence or underconfidence. 
When applying the recognition heuristic, persons identify the most known city as the biggest one. 
So, a city which has a soccer team playing in the main football league could be more recognizable 
than a city which have no such team and, therefore, more probably identified as the biggest. 
Gigerenzer (1991) shows that this simple procedure forecasted well real individual responses. He 
also proves that such a simple rule is actually smart, as it is able to give correct answers in about 
91% of the cases, when, for example, two German cities are randomly selected and coupled. 
Overconfidence can emerge, in some cases, when this rule is applied. Subjects, in fact, can 
perceive they have a chance of success of about 91% and state it as their mean level of 
confidence, if required. I f experimenters select specific couples of city, instead of using random 
extractions, this mean level of confidence could, yet, be wrong, and subjects could result 
overconfident or underconfident. According to Gigerenzer (1991), usually experiments propose just 
tricky couples of cities, so determining at the same time errors and overconfidence. In Gigerenzer’s 
experiment, on the contrary, overconfidence disappeared as random couples of cities are 
proposed. I f the biggest among the two selected cities is identifiable using the recognition 
heuristics, subjects are even underconfident, as they refer again to their rule general rate of 
success. According to Gigerenzer (1991) in most cases, experiments are, therefore, based on 
biased questions: too difficult ones are often selected. 
In these kinds of experiments, subjects can be required to evaluate their performance in two 
different ways: they can indicate their confidence for each single question, or give an overall rate 
for the whole test. According to Gigerenzer (1991), the procedure used is relevant, as it can 
activate the use of different heuristics. The recognition heuristics cannot be used in all cases, in 
fact. I f required to evaluate their overall performance (instead of indicating a case by case 
confidence), subjects could not be able and used to compute a mean value among different 
percentages1. They would probably use another reference point, as their mean rate of success in 
previous tests perceived as similar. Again, if the set of questions is not randomly selected, subjects 
would probably evaluate in a bad way their performance. 
More in general, take a person who usually experiences a rate of success of, say, 80%, in 
answering a specific kind of random selected question. When answering a biased set of questions, 
the rate of success is different. I f the questions are selected among the easiest ones (for any 
reason; in a natural environment question could be easier because our agent is actually facing a 
different situation), the subject will have a higher rate of success than expected. I f selection 
favours difficult items, the rate will be lower. This is true if subject are not able to evaluate that a 
specific set of questions is not random. So, according to this idea, those who know more are not 
necessarily most capable of evaluating their knowledge. Similarly persons used to have a god 
performance in a given task, could have an optimistic expectation for their performance in a more 
difficult task they perceive as similar to the previous one. 
This idea is coherent with a wide literature on rule following behaviours. A bounded rational agent 
is not able to deal with all information faced and to solve hard problems (Vanberg, 1993 and 
Heiner, 1983). Rules allow dealing with a complex environment as they provide a reliable action 
which can be activated in response to a limited set of information, as the recognition heuristic 
exemplifies. Rules require relatively stable environments and also the expectations of stability. I 
cannot apply today the strategy I  learned yesterday, if I  think that the world is now different. So 
rule following is based on some kind of intelligent inertia in the expectations (Rizzello, 1999) which 
can have also an emotional counterpart. In the managerial literature, sometimes we can find the 
expression "success trap", to indicate how some good practices, developed in a specific 
environment, can fail in different situations (Levinthal and March, 1993). I f agents are not able to 
recognize situations, a series of successes can be followed by some losses. While stable 
expectations can be often useful, and even necessary to learn (Novarese, 2009), they could also 
determine decisional errors and a wrong perception. 
                                                
1
 I f all answers can be given using the same heuristics, the mean value can be easily computed. 
Because of their nature, beside, rules have to be generic (or they couldn’t be applied in different 
situations). So, almost inevitably, some situations can activate more than one rule. Rules, in fact, 
have to be domain specific and so it could be normal to combine them. I f a decision require 
different skills, in fact, more than one rule need to be applied, as stated by Hayek (1969). The 
reality is complex, rules are abstract and specific. While in some occasion there could be just one 
clear rule, in other occasions, different bits of knowledge need to be applied. 
These ideas can help in understanding how students form their expectations on their future grade. 

7KHRYHUFRQILGHQFHRIVWXGHQWV
 
Overconfidence and over-optimism have also been used to explain student’s evaluation of their 
capacities, their expected grades, and the following performances and satisfaction. Bengtsson et al 
(2004), as an example, tested overconfidence, analysing if their students responded to the last 
demand of their written economics test. Such last question was devoted only to students who got 
at least a given rate in the previous part of the test. Those who spent time and energy in 
answering a question which gave them no score were overconfident. Males showed this behaviour 
in a higher degree than females. By construction, in this test, overconfidence was necessarily 
associated with bad results. 
Ochse (2001) asked her students, to state their expected grades before an exam, and then 
compared it with their real ones. She also required her students to state a level of confidence for 
the correctness of their same previsions. The most optimistic expectations (i.e. the ones with the 
highest difference from the real grade), and the highest levels of confidence were associated with 
worst performances. Ochse suggested the existence of a causal relation going from a high self 
perception to lower academic achievements. 
I t’s worth noting that forecasting a grade is just an assessment of one’s knowledge, quite similar 
to the indication of the percentage of correct answer in a given test. So, Oches required an 
evaluation of the same overconfidence (if forecasting the grade is seen the main task, the 
overconfidence need to be related to such a task). 
Grimes (2002) asked his students in Economics to predict their second mid term test score. He 
found a strong degree of overconfidence: most of the students’ expectations were higher than 
their real scores and very badly calibrated (calibration is measured as the relative difference 
between expected and real grade). The main determinants of overconfidence resulted to be: 
- age and experience (his sample included students of different ages and faculties, older and more 
mature ones were less overconfident and better calibrated); 
- academic abilities; confirming the finding of previous studies, academic and educational 
achievements proved to be related with less overconfidence and better predictive calibration; 
- students who had completed previous economics classes, in high school or college, had higher 
chances of over-predicting their performance; 
- the difference between student’s score in the first mid term exam and the average class’s score; 
getting better scores (in the specific course under evaluation) reduced again the probability of 
overconfidence. 
So Grimes found a clear negative correlation between students’ capacities (both in his course and 
in other previous academic courses; a student can have good mean grade, but a bad performance 
in Economics, so the two kind of indicators can differ) and overconfidence. In his view, 
overconfidence and bad calibration are caused by limits in meta-cognitive capacities, that are just 
the capacity to self evaluate one’s own knowledge and learning processes. Among cognitive 
psychologists there is a discussion on the real meaning and significance of meta-cognition. I t 
should be related to the capacity to exert control on what understood, when learning and "how to 
approach a given learning task, monitoring comprehension, and evaluating progress toward the 
completion of a task" (Livingston, 1997). So, the meta-cognitive skills would determine more 
controlled process and, therefore, should, at the same time, increases both the capacity to self 
evaluate and the performance. Yet, it is possible to imagine that meta-cognition have even a 
different effect. A better capacity to evaluate what I  know, can make me aware of what I  don’t 
know and determine underconfidence. 
 
7KHGDWD
 
My analysis is based on the data gathered on the students who attended my course in Economics, 
at the Faculty of Law, at the Università del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro, in the Academic 
Year 2005-2006. The sample used for the analysis includes all the 57 students who sustained the 
two midterm written examinations in Economics. All of them were just starting their academic 
experience, and represent a highly homogeneous sample. My Economic course had two midterm 
tests. These exams were open only for the persons who attended at least three quarter of the 
lessons. A week before any of them, students were required to state their expected grade for the 
test. All the information were collected by a helping student, enrolled in another course, and 
analyzed only after the exams. In this way I  tried to avoid an eventual attempt by my students to 
over-estimate their own expectations in order to influence my evaluation. A student could have 
feared that a low expectation would have been seen as a kind of declaration of bad study. So 
students could have had the incentive to over estimate their expectations. In order to avoid this, I  
introduced also a reward for the persons whose expectations were correct or wrong by plus or 
minus half a grade. This incentive was also used as a way to explicitly stimulate a proper self 
evaluation. 
At the beginning of my course I collected also some general information on my students. In 
particular I  asked the grade received at the end of high school (a variable quite relevant here)2. 
Table 1 reports detailed information on the timing of the exams and on the collection of 
information (some of these data are not used here, but are shown to give a complete picture). 
 
7DEOH7LPHWDEOHH[SHFWDWLRQVDQGJUDGH
 
September 18: lessons start 
October 3: Students were asked their grade at the end of the high school (SCOREHIGH) 
October 26 : Students declared their expectations for the score in the first exam (EXP1) 
November 2: First mid-term test in Economics 
November 7: Students were shown the score of their first test in Economics (SCORE1) and were 
required to state their satisfaction (SODD1) 
November 22: New test in economics for the students who didn’t pass the first one or were 
unsatisfied of the score 
November 25 Students were shown the score of the new test in Economics 
November 30: Students declared their expectations for the score in the second exam (EXP2) 
December 7: Second test in Economics 
December 10: Students were shown the score of the second test in Economics (SCORE2) 
 
+\SRWKHVLVDQGPRGHOVWREHHVWLPDWHG
 
In respect to the previous recalled analysis, my study presents some differences. My data are 
collected in a non experimental task, and I required my students to perform an ex-ante evaluation. 
Yet the studies presented can be anyway a point of departure. In fact, the kind of evaluation 
requested to my students is similar to the one in standard experiments: in both cases persons are 
required to state a percentage of correctness. I f we apply Gigerenzer (1991)’s idea, there should 
be no differences between ex ante or ex post evaluations, as both should be based on a same 
general rate of success of a given rule. 
From another perspective, yet, rule following does not necessarily determine an automatic and 
simple behaviour. Rules can be seen as components of individual knowledge (Vromen, 2004). 
                                                
2 I  required this information at the beginning of my lessons so not to suggest any link with the expected grade for the 
mid term tests. 
Subjects can’t be always able to isolate simple contexts where just one simple rule can be 
activated. As my students’ expectations had to be stated a week before the exam, meta-cognition 
could have played a minor role. In fact, the amount of pages to be studied for both pre-tests was 
small. High school students are used to study just the few days before their exams. So my 
students’ expectations could have been based also on their self confidence and optimism toward 
the future. In this perspective, overconfidence could be more a result, than a product of worse 
knowledge. An aptitude like optimism can be connected to a rule based perception of the world, as 
it requires constant expectations and perception of the world and some kind of standard response 
(even something like: "don’t worry, everything will be ok") to a situation perceived as similar to a 
reference one (Bateson, 1973). In doing this evaluation they could have been influenced by their 
previous experiences at school, a natural similar situation; they could, yet, have associated my 
exam to some specific course attended and to the relative grade, more than to their general 
previous experience (a student could have had a low grade in, say, math, and a good overall 
evaluation and economics could have been perceived as more similar to math than to other 
disciplines). So, as in the analysis proposed by Grimes (2002) different factors can account for the 
final results and determine more or less overconfidence and predictive calibration; in other words: 
the capacity to forecast should be related to different attitudes and levels of skills. I  take the 
estimations proposed by Grimes (2002) as a starting point3, trying to investigate some new 
aspects. Overconfidence and calibration are measured here using two variables: PREC and DIFF 
(followed by a number - 1 or 2 - which indicates if the variable is relative to the first or to the 
second exam). The variable PREC is used by Grimes and inspired by Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 
(1977). I t is computed as the ratio between the squared difference between grade and 
expectation and the same expectation. It measures predictive capacity, independently from over or 
under estimation. The second index, DIFF, is just the absolute difference between the grade and 
the expectation. I t assumes, therefore, a negative value when the expectations are higher than 
the real evaluations and there is overconfidence. So it measures the existence and magnitude of 
overconfidence. Table 2 defines all variables used in the following analysis. 
 
7DEOH/LVWRIYDULDEOHV
BETTER=  1 if SCORE2> SCORE1; 0 otherwise 
DIFF1=  SCORE1 - EXP1 
DIFF2=  SCORE2 - EXP2 
EXP1: pre-test expected score of the first test 
EXP2: pre-test expected score of the second test 
FEM=  1 if student is female; 0 otherwise (females are the 68% of the sample) 
OVERC1 =  1 if EXP1 >  SCORE1 (overconfidence); 0 otherwise 
OVERC2 =  1 if EXP2 >  SCORE2 (overconfidence); 0 otherwise 
PREC1=  (SCORE1-EXP1)2 / (EXP1) 
PREC2=  (SCORE2-EXP2)2/ (EXP2) 
SCORE1: score of the first test (on 30) 
SCORE2: score of the second test (on 30) 
SCORE2OVERC=  SCORE2, if the student is overconfident in the second exam; 0 elsewhere 
SCORE2UNDERC=  SCORE2, if the student is not overconfident in the second exam; 0 elsewhere 
SCOREHIGH: score got at the end of the high school (from 0.6 to 1) 
TEST1AGAIN =  1 if the student choose to sustain the recover test; 0 elsewhere 
                                                
3
 The two data set are different, also because the academic situations are different. In my class expectations were 
collected a week before the exam and not two days before it. All of my students were attending their first year at 
University and were all nineteen or twenty years old. No ethnic variables can be tested here, as all students were Italian. 
In respect to Grimes’s paper no data are available on the average number of hours spent studying. Only students who 
attended at least three quarters of the lessons were allowed to keep the two mid term examinations and so my sample 
is homogeneous also in this regard. So I don’t need to check for students’ age, ethic origins, or presence at lesson. I f 
some variables are missing in respect to Grimes (2002), new variables are available and this allow to widen his analysis. 
Besides, in this case there was an attempt to reduce overconfidence, motivating students with the additional grade in 
case of good forecasting. 
 My analysis will be focused on the following points. 
.QRZLQJPRUH
Previous evidence on the effect of this variable is not so clear. While worst performances are 
generally associated with overconfidence and bad calibration, best results are not necessarily 
linked with fine forecasting capacities, as sometimes they are associated with underconfidence. I f 
evaluating one’s one knowledge is difficult, and expectations tended to converge toward a mean 
value identical for all students, best students would be underconfident and worst one 
overconfident. This would depend on a common incapacity to evaluate. A similar empirical relation 
between overconfidence and performance could arise also in a different way: overconfidence could 
be the cause of a bad preparation and not (only) its effect. Students who feel optimistic in relation 
to their goals might have a minor stimulus to study and get, therefore, worse results. These two 
causes can be both at stake at the same time and cannot be distinguished here. 
The capacity to calibrate could be a kind of individual attitude: persons with good meta-cognitive 
capacities are always better calibrated. The capacity to have realistic expectations could also be 
related to a specific domain: I ’m well calibrated where I ’m expert, but not where I ’m not. To test 
for these alternative ideas, we need different indicators of capacity. Students’ capacities can, in 
fact, be measured in different ways: we can use the performance in the same exam on which we 
test overconfidence or a different and previous index of attainment (as Grimes, 2002 does). I f we 
measure students’ performance with the same grade used to compute PREC and the presence of 
overconfidence, there could be measurement problems related to mathematical effect. Assume, for 
example, that EXP= SCORE +  u, where u is a random error (so expectation would be equal to the 
real score but for a random error), we would have: 
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In this case PREC would reduce, when SCORE increases - as the expected error would be fixed -
reducing the relative difference between EXP and SCORE. In this case the link would have a limited 
economic meaning: in relative term, best students’ errors are less relevant than those of worst 
ones. Different measures of students’ capacities (as score got in a previous exam) have a similar 
problem as they could be related with the score in the same exam, just acting as its proxy. 
Under different hypothesis on the determinants of expectations, the relation between PREC and 
SCORE can be more informative but, also, again biased by mathematical effect. I f all students state 
a similar expectation at a mean level, best ones would be underconfident and the other 
overconfident, just for a technical matter. 
So analysing the links between calibration and capacities is not so easy. There are different 
possible explanations and some possible technical difficulties, also for the simple link between 
overconfidence and performance. In this paper I  try to distinguish between the competence in the 
specific exam and a more general habit to good result. The performance in the specific exam is 
mainly used as a control variable, so to be able to analyse the role of the other effect. As a 
secondary effect, yet, my analysis will anyway allow to gather additional empirical evidence on this 
point. The questions to be answered are these one: 
- are the worst students overconfident? 
- are even the best students underconfident and not so well calibrated? 
To answer them, especially the last one, it is necessary to evaluate if the relation between score 
and predictive calibration is non linear and/or if there is a linear link between score and DIFF. 
3DVWH[SHULHQFH
Ceteris paribus, students used to get good grades could be more overconfident and also less 
calibrated in their expectations (overconfidence is necessarily related to a wrong calibration). 
Usually, as seen, competence should allow a good forecasting performance or, at least, could 
determine underconfidence. Here I ’m stating that, leaving a part capacity and preparation, 
students with better curricula can be more overconfident in their expectations that those used to 
get lower scores. 
This idea can be tested using the score got in the high school as an indicator of students past 
habits to good or bad results. Such a variable is probably correlated with the score got in the two 
tests under consideration. The correlation is, yet, not necessarily strong, as there are many 
differences between high school and university. Besides, students arrived from various high 
schools, and a same score might be the results of quite different levels of real study, work and 
effective attainment. I t could, therefore, be a better indicator of my student’s habit to good or bad 
results than of their real capacities. I ts effect on the new performance can be ambiguous and 
change according to the other regressors inserted in the estimations. 
,PSURYLQJWKHVFRUH
Grimes’s students who improved their grade between their first and second exam, had a better 
predictive calibration and were less overconfident. I ’ll try to test this idea, using the dummy 
variable BETTER. 
6H[
In many empirical analyses, females result less overconfident. I ’ll test this effect too (with the 
dummy variable FEM). 
6DWLVIDFWLRQIRUVFRUH
My students, if not satisfied with their first term grade, had the chance to repeat it a second time. 
These students need to be signalled in the estimations, as they took a new exam and eventually 
got a new score, who substituted SCORE1. I  use the dummy variable TEST1AGAIN, to control for this 
aspect. A student, who re-did the first test, probably had a higher self evaluation which, ceteris 
paribus, could create overconfidence. Among many similar students those who decided to give 
again the exam, are the ones with a higher self evaluation, so, probably also more self-confidence. 
 
5HVXOWV

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Table 3 shows some preliminary statistics for the main indicators under analysis. In both tests, 
mean expectations were higher than the real grades. In the first one, the difference is about more 
than four points and almost all students were overconfident (93% of the sample). In the second 
test there was a strong improvement, but still 56% of the participants were overconfident and 
their mean expected grade was still higher than the real one. The score increased and the 
expectations decreased, with an obvious following reduction in their difference (DIFF). Table 3b 
shows that all of the differences between the first and second exam are significant according both 
to the t and the non parametric test for paired data. 
 
7DEOHD'HVFULSWLYHVWDWLVWLFVIRUWKHPDLQLQGLFDWRUV
  
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
SCOREHIGH 0.60 1 0.87 0.12 
EXP1 19 29 26.3 1.75 
SCORE1 16.5 27.0 22.1 2.88 
PREC1 .00 2.89 .9 .78 
DIFF1 -8.50 1.00 -4.3 2.44 
EXP2 18 28 23.6 1.99 
SCORE2 17 29 22.7 3.49 
PREC2 .00 2.89 .47 .57 
DIFF2 -8.50 5.00 -.86 3.25 
 
7DEOHE(YROXWLRQRIWKHPDLQLQGLFDWRUVEHWZHHQWKHILUVWDQGVHFRQGWHVW
   
Pvalue 
t- test Pvalue 
EXP1-EXP2 26.3 23.6 .000 0.000 
SCORE1 22.1 22.7 .084 0.053 
PREC1 .91 .47 .000 0.000 
DIFF1 -4.25 -.86 .000 0.000 
 
Table 4 shows some correlation coefficients useful for the present analysis. All values are positive, 
as expected, so SCOREHIGH is positively related with both expectations and test performances, but 
the relation is not so strong (even if it is not so easy defining how high they should be). The 
expectations for both tests are positively and significantly related with the real score, but again the 
correlation seems relatively weak. 
 
7DEOH&RUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQWVDPRQJVRPHVHOHFWHGYDULDEOHV
 EXP1 SCORE1 EXP2 SCORE2 SCOREHIGH 
EXP1 1     
SCORE1 .54 
.000 
1    
EXP2 .58 
.000 
.60 
.000 
1   
SCORE2 .41 
.001 
.63 
.000 
.40 
.002 
1  
SCHOREHIGH .51 
.000 
.48 
.000 
.43 
.001 
.54 
.000 
1 
N= 57 in all cases; the first number in any cell is the parameter, the second is the P-value of the t test 
 
(VWLPDWLRQV
 
3UHGLFWLYHFDOLEUDWLRQLQWKHILUVWWHVW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Table 5 shows the results of a series of estimations aimed at explaining the determinants of 
predictive calibration in the first test. As almost all students were overconfident, PREC1 measures 
just the dimension of the overconfidence (and it makes no sense estimating also DIFF1). When 
SCOREHIGH is inserted without SCORE1 (and therefore it works as a proxy for student capacity), the 
sign of its parameter is negative and significant. When we add SCORE1 in the model, SCOREHIGH is 
still significant but takes a positive sign. In this case SCORE1 assumes a negative sign: higher 
scores are related with lower values of PREC1. The last estimation (number 5), includes among the 
regressors, the squared value of SCORE1 so to test for eventual non linear effects of the score. This 
variable is significant and positive, while SCORE1 remains negative. The overall relation between 
SCORE1 and PREC1 is therefore represented by a parabola. In a first moment, when the score 
increases, PREC decreases, but then it starts to increase too. So the best students are not as well 
calibrated as those with a medium score. Also in this last estimation, SCOREHIGH maintains its 
significance and a positive value. The dummy control for female students (FEM) is never significant. 
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 est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 
Costant 2.3 
.003 
2.3 
.003 
5.6 
.000 
5.2 
.000 
13.0 
.001 
FEM 
 
.1 
.562 
.2 
.251 
.1 
.403 
.2 
.194 
SCOREHIGH -1.6 
.068 
-1.7 
.059  
1.1 
.076 
1.3 
.032 
SCORE1  
 -.2 -.2 -1.0 
.000 .000 .005 
SCORE1^ 2    
 
.02 
.031 
    
 
 
R^ 2 0.06 0.07 0.65 0.67 0.70 
Adjusted R^ 2  0.04 0.03 0.63 0.65 0.67 
P-value F 0.068 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N= 57 in all cases; the first number in any cell is the parameter, the second is the P-value of the t test 
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The first ten columns in table 5 show a series of estimations with PREC2 as dependent variable. 
The first one includes as regressors: FEMALE, SCORE1, SCOREHIGH, and TEST1AGAIN. In this model, 
SCORE1 is supposed to get the effect of student’s capacity, while SCOREHIGH should keep its past 
experience. SCORE1 has a negative effect: its higher values increase the capacity to calibrate, while 
high SCOREHIGH reduces it. The second estimation is qualitatively similar, but with SCORE2 (a better 
indicator of the performance in the second test) instead of SCORE1. Results are similar but the 
overall fit is improved. I f both scores are inserted (est3), SCORE1 looses its significance, while 
SCOREHIGH is always positive and significant. This result holds in all different estimations. So its 
effect seems quite robust. Estimations 5 and 6 include PREC1, which can be seen as a measure of 
both capacity (worse students had higher values of PREC1) and of an individual attitude to wrong 
calibration and overconfidence; it is highly significant and it gives the estimation a strong fit. 
TEST1AGAIN has always a positive and significant effect. The parameter of the dummy variable for 
females is almost always significant and negative; yet it loses its significance in the last estimation 
(est9), when SCORE22 (the squared value of the score got in the second exam) is inserted, and, 
therefore, the model account for the non linear effect of the score. Probably among medium-
scored students there are many females. When the model keeps the difference between medium 
and high scores, FEM lose most of its effect4. 
The fit of my models (measured by the adjusted R-squared) is about the same as the one 
estimated by Grimes (equal to 0.31), but when the SCORE22 is introduced in the estimation, it 
increases quite a lot. This shows the relevance of this non linearity. As in Grimes, even here 
students who improved their grade in the second test (BETTER= 1) had a better capacity to 
calibrate; yet, the variable which keeps this effect ceases to be significant, when SCORE22 is 
inserted in the estimation, maybe because students who improved were the ones with medium 
votes (it’s difficult, in fact, to improve an already high grade); so when the model can account for 
the predictive un-calibration of high graded students, BETTER become no more relevant. 
Overconfident students (OVERC2= 1) are not worst calibrators than others; this is another hint for 
the existence of problem in calibration arising from underconfidence. 
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The last five columns of table 6 show estimations with DIFF2 as dependent variable. When positive, 
this variable signals underconfidence (SCORE2> EXP2), while it is negative when there is 
overconfidence. The first two estimations include respectively SCORE1 or SCOREHIGH to measure 
student’s capacities. They both have a positive and significant effect. Again SCORE1 is proposed 
together with TEST1AGAIN, which is still significant (here and in all other models): students who did 
again the first exams are more overconfident. When SCORE2 is inserted in the model (est13), both 
SCORE1 and SCOREHIGH acquire a negative and significant sign, while SCORE2 has a positive effect. I f 
expectations were randomly selected, we would just have a positive sign (if students were not 
capable of forecasting their grades, the ones with a better performance would be less 
overconfident by construction). Yet, as seen, EXP2 and SCORE2 are significantly correlated and 
                                                
4
 Even PREC1 - in an estimation not shown - loses its significance when SCORE22 is inserted, as it probably keep, in some 
way, the non linear effect of the score. 
expectations are, therefore, not completely random. I f all students had the same capacity to 
forecast their grade, this parameter should be equal to zero. So a positive sign is not completely 
obvious and signals a general difficulty in forecasting. The last estimation tries to find out if SCORE2 
plays a different effect for overconfident students, in respect to the others. The effect of SCORE2 is 
now divided in two variables, one (SCORE2OVERC) for overconfident students, the second for all 
others. So the effect of the score is now allowed to be different for these two groups. I f 
overconfidence arises just because of bad knowledge, the parameter of SCORE2UNDER should be 
null or negative (best students should have the lowest values of DIFF2) while the other parameter 
should be positive. Yet, on the contrary, the two parameters are almost identical (and therefore 
are not significantly different). Even the best students were bad calibrators, because of 
underconfidence. When controlling for all variables (est13-15) the dummy for females (FEM) results 
significant with a positive sign: female students are less overconfident (while they are not 
necessarily well calibrated in their expectations, as seen). 
When inserted with SCORE2 in the estimation of PREC2, SCORE1 is not significant, while it is 
significant in the estimation of DIFF2. So a good performance in the first exam didn’t influence 
predictive calibration in the second test, but increased the probability of overconfidence. 
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In the estimation of DIFF2 which includes SCORE2OVERC and SCORE2UNDER, SCOREHIGH is almost 
irrelevant. Probably there is a relation between the score got at high school and being 
overconfident. I f this effect is signalled by the two different variables for SCORE2, SCOREHIGH loses 
significance. So SCOREHIGH has a strong impact on PREC2 and on the probability of being 
overconfident, while its effect on DIFF2 is weaker. This suggests the need for estimations 10 and 
15. The first one uses PREC2 as dependent variable and includes the squared value of SCOREHIGH, 
to account for an eventual non linear effect (suggested by these empirical findings, while un-
previously expected). The estimation confirms such non linearity. So, after a given threshold, a 
high value of SCOREHIGH starts to reduce overconfidence. 
The model 15 uses two variables instead of SCOREHIGH, allowing two different effects for 
overconfident (SCOREHIGHOVERS) and for the others (SCOREHIGHUNDER) students. The sign of the 
parameter is negative and significant for the overconfident persons, while it is non significant for 
the others, as now expected. 
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 PREC2 DIFF2 
 est1 est2 est3 est4 est5 est6 est7 est8 est9 est10 est11 est12 est13 est14 est15 
Costant .8 
.190 
1.0 
.068 
1.1 
.072 
1.1 
.067 
-.5 
.358 
-.5 
.389 
1.3 
.072 
8.5 
.030 
11.8 
.000 
7.3 
.030 
-7.4 
.020 
-8.4 
.007 
-11.7 
.000 
-9.2 
.000 
-8.7 
.000 
FEM -.3 
.032 
-.3 
.016 
-.3 
.017 
-.3 
.020 
-.3 
.016 
-.3 
.017 
-.3 
.030 
-.3 
.073 
-.2 
.131 
-.2 
.165 
.9 
.276 
.6 
.542 
.9 
.035 
.8 
.036 
.7 
0.051 
SCORE1 -.06 
.043  
-.0 
.732 
-.0 
.566   
-.1 
.006 
-.8 
.033 
 -0.0 
0.983 
.3 
.046  
-.3 
.000 
-.3 
.003 
-.2 
0.007 
SCORE1^ 2 
       
.02 
.054 
   
  
 
 
SCOREHIGH 1.2 
.085 
1.7 
.008 
1.8 
.008 
1.8 
.008 
1.2 
.048 
1.2 
.049 
1.8 
.012 
1.8 
.007 
1.5 
.007 
15.4 
.038 
 8.3 
.021 
-5.2 
.016 
-3.1 
.117 
 
TEST1AGAIN 1.0 
.001 
.8 
.002 
.8 
.002 
.8 
.004 
.8 
.006 
.8 
.006 
.8 
.005 
.8 
.003 
.7 
.005 
.7 
.004 
-4.3 
.007 
 -2.2 
.011 
-2.0 
.012 
-2.2 
0.003 
SCORE2 
 
-.1 
.000 
-.1 
.003 
-.1 
.098   
  -1.1 
.000 
-1.2 
.000 
  1.0 
.000 
 
 
SCORE2^ 2 
 
 
     
 .02 
.000 
.02 
.000 
  
 
 
 
BETTER 
 
 
 
-.1 
.639 
-.3 
.034 
-.3 
.057 
-.4 
.024 
-.3 
.032 
-.0 
.970 
-.1 
.721 
  
 
 
 
PREC1 
 
 
 
 .3 
.002 
.3 
.003 
      
 
  
OVERC2 
 
 
 
 
 
-.0 
.814 
-.1 
.617 
     
 
  
SCORE2(OVERC) 
 
 
 
         
 
.7 
.000 
.8 
0.000 
SCORE2(UNDER) 
 
 
 
         
 
.7 
.000 
.5 
0.000 
SCOREDIP^ 2 
 
 
 
      -8.3 
.059 
 
 
 
  
SCOREHIGHOVER 
 
 
 
         
 
 -6.5 
0.006 
SCOREHIGHUNDER 
 
 
 
         
 
 2.9 
0.335 
                R^ 2 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.58 0.61 0.23 0.11 0.81 0.85 0.87 
Adjusted R^ 2  0.23 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.41 0.53 0.55 0.18 0.08 0.79 0.83 0.85 
P-value F 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.000 0.000 0.00 
N= 57 in all cases; the first number in any cell is the parameter, the second is the P-value of the t test 
/RJLWHVWLPDWLRQV
 
Table 7 shows the results of three logit estimations with OVERC2 as dependent dichotomous 
variable (it is equal to one for the overconfident students, while it is equal to zero for all others, 
that is both underconfident students and those who perfectly forecasted their grades). When 
inserted with SCORE2, both SCORE1 and SCOREHIGH have a positive and significant sign, increasing 
the chance of overconfidence. SCORE2 has a negative sign: better students are less probably 
overconfident. SCORE1 alone is significant, but with a positive sign, as in this case (est2) it mainly 
measures students’ capacity. SCOREHIGH alone is negative but not significant. The dummy variable 
for female students is never significant. 

7DEOH/RJLWHVWLPDWLRQVZLWK ﬀﬂﬁﬃ! DVGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOH
 est1 est2 est3 
Costant 3.2 
.123 
4.3 
.068 
12.3 
.035 
FEM -.1 
.813 
-.3 
.586 
-1.4 
.220 
SCORE_HIGH -3.3 
.170 
 13.4 
0.037 
SCORE1  -.2 
.085 
.5 
.062 
TEST1AGAIN  20.9 
.999 
20.2 
.999 
SCORE2   -1.4 
.000 
    
Chi-squared 0.330 0.039 0.000 
correct prediction 63% 60% 83% 

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My analysis tried to bring more empirical evidence on overconfidence. I  evaluated if my students 
were able to state a realistic expectations for their future performance. Most of my students were 
overconfident in predicting their future performances in both of their exams. As they were at their 
beginning at the University, their difficulties in forecasting could be not surprising, while it is less 
obvious their overconfidence. In the second test there was, yet, a significant improvement in their 
predictive capacity and self evaluation, but overconfidence still prevailed. In both cases, 
overconfidence in expectations was connected with students’ performance, while predictive 
calibration showed a non linear relation with their grade. Also better students, in fact, weren’t well 
calibrated. This evidenced a general incapacity to predict one’s own performance. Students who 
got the highest grades were, ceteris paribus, less calibrated than the ones who got medium 
scores. So while bad performances were characterized by overconfidence, the best performances 
come along with underconfidence. I f expectations were fixed and identical for all students, this 
result would just be obvious: nobody is capable of making realistic forecasting and given identical 
expectations, better students are underconfidence while worse ones are overconfidence (yet while 
should worse students have the same expectations as the best ones if not because of 
overconfidence?). Expectations had a lower variance than the real grades but they were not 
identical for all students and resulted positively correlated with the real grades. Better students 
had higher expectations that worse one and proportionally higher grades. A path of this kind could 
be, at least in part, the cause and not the effect of student’s performance as it could reveal a 
different attitude to meta-cognition and/or self confidence which would stimulate a more attentive 
study. 
When controlling for the performance in the specific exam, past good results (both the score got in 
high school - and the score of the first test, when we analyze the second one) stimulated biased 
expectations, increasing the chance to be overconfident and not well calibrated. Usually, in 
experiments on overconfidence, there is no measure of the past performance in similar 
environment, while the score got in high school is here a good indicator of student’s habit. So, this 
is probably the most innovative results of this work, that was also suggested by the literature on 
rule based behaviour and perception. Persons used to get good results, even if capable of 
understanding that their knowledge is not so good, could be biased by a kind of inertia in their 
expectations: "all my past test were always good, maybe even when I wasn’t so optimist". 
According to Gigerenzer (1991), when asked to evaluate their overall performance in a test, 
persons would probably use their past performances in situations perceived as similar. Previous 
performances at high school could be a natural reference for students in University. Yet, as in I taly 
there are many kinds of high school and University requires different skills, this reference could be 
biased and determine overconfidence. Students used to get good results in bad schools, were 
probably not able to evaluate that the situations changed and their capacities had been 
overestimated in the past years. So the relation between capacities and overconfidence was here 
reverted, and still non linear. The threshold where the effect is reversed is, yet, quite high (at 
about 0.96); practically it affects only the values of the students who got the maximum grade at 
high school. This effect could also suggests that best students who got the maximum grade at 
high school could have some specific meta-cognitive capacities increasing their calibration. Yet, 
ceteris paribus, students who got the maximum score (100%) was less calibrated than the ones 
who had a low result (as even 80%). So, better students, ceteris paribus, are more overconfident, 
yet, usually, better students are also more prepared in the specific exam, so this effect can be 
hardly measurable and the inertia in expectations could be masked by competence. My analysis, in 
fact, also evidenced measurement difficulties in studying overconfidence. I  proposed different 
specifications of my models, just to investigate the robustness of the effects under analysis. Some 
parameters are very robust, while others seemed to be quite dependent on specification. Some 
variables are, probably, proxies for other ones, and this sometimes hide their real effects, which 
emerge just when the right variables are also inserted. So, even in the study of overconfidence we 
need to be careful, so to avoid an excessive trust in our results! 
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